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<rss version="2.0"><channel><title>Peakhour.IO - Network Fingerprinting</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/</link><description></description><lastBuildDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2026 11:20:00 +1000</lastBuildDate><item><title>The IP Changed. Did the Actor?</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/correlate-actors-across-rotating-ips/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;Residential proxy rotation defeats IP-only counters. The answer is not a new identity claim, but a carefully chosen set of cohort, account, route, and outcome keys.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2026 11:20:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-08-01:/blog/correlate-actors-across-rotating-ips/</guid><category>Rate Limiting</category><category>Rate Limiting</category><category>Residential Proxies</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>Bot Management</category><category>API Security</category></item><item><title>Residential Proxy Detection for APIs Without JavaScript</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/residential-proxy-detection-apis-without-javascript/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;APIs cannot depend on browser JavaScript to expose proxy abuse. They need server-side network, protocol, identity, route, and outcome evidence in the request path.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2026 11:10:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-08-01:/blog/residential-proxy-detection-apis-without-javascript/</guid><category>API Security</category><category>API Security</category><category>Residential Proxies</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>Rate Limiting</category><category>Bot Management</category></item><item><title>Two Lineages of TLS Fingerprinting: JA3, JA4 and Cisco Mercury</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/two-lineages-tls-fingerprinting/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;JA4 did not descend from Cisco Mercury. The two projects come from different strands of TLS fingerprinting research and solve different operational problems.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2026 09:00:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-07-26:/blog/two-lineages-tls-fingerprinting/</guid><category>Security</category><category>TLS Fingerprinting</category><category>JA3</category><category>JA4</category><category>Cisco Mercury</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>Threat Detection</category></item><item><title>Before JA3: How TLS Handshakes Became Fingerprints</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/before-ja3-tls-fingerprinting-history/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;JA3 made TLS fingerprints easy to log and share, but the technical ideas behind it had already been tested in SSL Labs experiments, a p0f patch and FingerprinTLS.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 09:00:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-07-19:/blog/before-ja3-tls-fingerprinting-history/</guid><category>Security</category><category>TLS Fingerprinting</category><category>JA3</category><category>FingerprinTLS</category><category>p0f</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>Security Research</category></item><item><title>A Network Fingerprint Is a Cohort, Not a Client</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/fingerprint-is-a-cohort-not-a-client/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;TLS fingerprints group similar protocol implementations. They do not prove which application, device or person made a request.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 09:28:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-07-13:/blog/fingerprint-is-a-cohort-not-a-client/</guid><category>Security</category><category>TLS Fingerprinting</category><category>JA3</category><category>JA4</category><category>Cisco Mercury</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>Bot Management</category></item><item><title>From Joy to Mercury and EVE: Following Cisco's Network Fingerprinting Work</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/from-joy-to-mercury-and-eve/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;Cisco's open-source collectors, fingerprinting research and Encrypted Visibility Engine form a clear lineage, but they are not interchangeable parts of one public system.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 09:28:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-07-13:/blog/from-joy-to-mercury-and-eve/</guid><category>Security</category><category>Cisco Joy</category><category>Cisco Mercury</category><category>Encrypted Visibility Engine</category><category>TLS Fingerprinting</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>Encrypted Traffic</category></item><item><title>What an Open Network Fingerprint Database Should Publish</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/open-network-fingerprint-database-schema/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;A useful open fingerprint database needs provenance, competing labels, raw evidence, format versions and licences—not another unexplained hash list.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 09:28:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-07-13:/blog/open-network-fingerprint-database-schema/</guid><category>Security</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>TLS Fingerprinting</category><category>JA4</category><category>Cisco Mercury</category><category>Security Research</category></item><item><title>Public Fingerprint Databases Are Not Ground Truth</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/public-fingerprint-databases-are-not-ground-truth/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;We reviewed the main public fingerprint resources. The formats are open, but current application labels and auditable ground truth remain scarce.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 09:28:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-07-13:/blog/public-fingerprint-databases-are-not-ground-truth/</guid><category>Security</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>TLS Fingerprinting</category><category>JA3</category><category>JA4</category><category>Threat Intelligence</category></item><item><title>Does TLS Fingerprint Canonicalisation Hide Attacker Variation? How to Test It</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/tls-fingerprint-canonicalisation-attacker-variation/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;Sorting makes TLS fingerprints more stable, but it also removes ordering evidence. Here is how to test whether the discarded variation matters.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 09:28:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-07-13:/blog/tls-fingerprint-canonicalisation-attacker-variation/</guid><category>Security</category><category>TLS Fingerprinting</category><category>JA4</category><category>Cisco Mercury</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>Security Research</category></item><item><title>Using Network Fingerprints in Bot and Rate-Limit Decisions</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/using-network-fingerprints-in-bot-and-rate-limit-decisions/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;A practical way to use network fingerprints for bot and rate-limit decisions without mistaking a shared client cohort for identity.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 09:28:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-07-13:/blog/using-network-fingerprints-in-bot-and-rate-limit-decisions/</guid><category>Security</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>TLS Fingerprinting</category><category>JA4</category><category>Bot Management</category><category>Rate Limiting</category></item><item><title>One ClientHello, Three Fingerprints: JA3, JA4 and Mercury</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/one-clienthello-ja3-ja4-mercury-lab/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;A reproducible lab runs JA3, JA4 and Cisco Mercury against the same TLS ClientHello and compares what each fingerprint preserves.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 09:00:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-07-12:/blog/one-clienthello-ja3-ja4-mercury-lab/</guid><category>Security</category><category>TLS Fingerprinting</category><category>JA3</category><category>JA4</category><category>Cisco Mercury</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>Security Research</category></item><item><title>Fingerprints Are Evidence, Not Identity</title><link>https://www.peakhour.io/blog/fingerprints-are-evidence-not-identity/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;Browser and network fingerprints are useful security evidence, but they should not be treated as proof of a person's identity.&lt;/p&gt;</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">AC</dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +1000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:www.peakhour.io,2026-06-19:/blog/fingerprints-are-evidence-not-identity/</guid><category>API Security</category><category>API Security</category><category>Fingerprinting</category><category>Bot Management</category><category>Account Protection</category><category>Network Fingerprinting</category><category>Browser Fingerprinting</category></item></channel></rss>